For example, the intensity of beacon light to be used on vehicles, coordination phraseology between ATC and driver etcetera. MASB and CAAM is suggested to have a specific Chapter or Annexes in the existing SOP listing down the specification of vehicle to be used for manoeuvring area including vehicle accessories which need to be installed.
#Atc vehicle manual#
MASB and CAAM need to coordinate an effort to ensure that the means of communication between ground vehicle operating within the manoeuvring area and Air Traffic Controller is in accordance to ICAO Doc 9870 – Manual on The Prevention of Runway Incursion, Chapter 4, Paragraph 4.2.6 which require the use of VHF radio.Any amendment or changes of shift manning need to be officially published. CAAM is to ensure the shift manning especially during low traffic density is to take into consideration of human fatigue as recommended in the ICAO Doc 9966 – The Manual for the Oversight of Fatigue Management Approaches.
Incorrect information of vehicle activities on the runway handed over to the taking over controller led to the landing clearance given without realising the runway is occupied. All maintenance works for the runway needs to be coordinated between MASB and Control Tower. is the organisation responsible for the maintenance of the airport such as the runway lighting, runway marking and other facilities within SAAS Airport, Subang. Break Shift is not published in any document as an approved ATC Tower manning system. The “Break Shift” roster divided among the four controllers rostered for the night shift. During the time range of before and after the accident, Aerodrome Control manning have been reduced to one controller per shift for one and a half hour on each rotation from 0001hrs until 0600hrs in a system named as “Break Shift”. The Aerodrome Control consist of Tower Supervisor, Aerodrome Control, Surface Movement Control, Assistant Surface Movement Control and Assistant Tower/Coordinator. As the light was destroyed the investigators could not determine its intensity or whether it was still operating at impact.ĪTC services provided by Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia ( CAAM). It was also not visible when CCTV footage was examined.
Neither the ATCO nor the flight crew saw the light which the painting crew confirm had been on. The escort vehicle (only) was fitted with an amber flashing light. No response was observed from the escort vehicle, and as the aircraft was getting closer to them, the driver drove…away from the runway and stop at taxiway Foxtrot to give way for the aircraft to land. …they flashed the headlights of their vehicle several times to attract the escort vehicle attention. While making a 180 degrees turn, the driver realised the escorting vehicle was still static. The team leader on the painting vehicle did see the landing lights of the business jet on approach.įearing of the danger, all three workers boarded their vehicle and drove away from the runway. Although there was a written record of the work commencing, when the electrical working party left the runway at 02:15 Local Time the log recorded that all vehicles were clear. However, in the handover between ATC shifts at 03:00 Local Time there was no mention of ongoing work. The Duty Air Traffic Controller had radio communications with the escort vehicle not the painting contractors vehicle. The SUV had been escorting a runway painting vehicle (with three occupants) that had been authorised to enter the runway at 01:00 Local Time to paint centre line markings, 10 minutes after a separate electrical working party had been cleared to conduct runway lighting work. Escort Vehicle after Berjaya Air Bombardier BD-100-1A10 Challenger 300 9M-TST Collided with it on Landing at Kuala Lumpur-Sultan Abdul Aziz Shah Airport (Credit: Malaysian AAIB) The AAIB Safety Investigation
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